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The Purest Treasure mortal times afford 
Is spotless reputation . . . .1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Society has long considered one’s reputation an interest worth 
protecting.2  At the same time, the law protects an equally 
important interest in free, uninhibited political speech.3  At the 
intersection of these two competing interests lies the doctrine of 
privilege: the freedom, enjoyed by certain public officials, under 
certain circumstances, to defame others with impunity.4  
Effective democracy is rooted in the principle that “debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and 
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes 
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”5  
Free, uninhibited speech by government officials allows voters to 
make informed decisions, influence policy makers, and check 
abuse of power by public officials by voting those members out of 
office.6  Freedom of speech is also essential for the discovery of 
truth.7  
It is thought that any threat of defamation liability will cause 
responsible government officials to perform their duties more 
timidly,8 thus inhibiting the free flow of ideas we deem essential to 
 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, act 1, sc. 1. 
 2. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:2 (2d ed. 2011).  The 
pre-thirteenth century remedy for defamation was to cut out the offender’s 
tongue.  Id.  For an overview of the history of defamation law, see generally Van 
Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 
33 (1904). 
 3. See Joel F. Handler & William A. Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation 
Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44, 44 (1960). 
 4. 30 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, LIBEL AND SLANDER § 4.00 (2011). 
 5. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 6. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 926 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 7. See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 
F.2d 289, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The nation’s welfare is dependent upon officials 
who are willing to speak forthrightly and disclose violations of the law and other 
activities contrary to the public interest. Their voices will be stilled if they perceive 
or fear that the person involved has the resources or disposition to defend with all 
affirmative tactics.  When millions may turn on regulatory decisions, there is a 
strong incentive to counterattack.”); see also Comment, Absolute Immunity: Too Broad 
a Protection for the “Public Interest”?, 10 STAN. L. REV. 589, 590 (1958) [hereinafter 
Absolute Immunity] (“It is further suggested that responsible men will not assume 
government office, or will perform their duties timidly, if they are open to 
2
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the effective functioning of our democracy.9  Therefore, certain 
government officials are granted the privilege to make defamatory 
statements—not in a desire to protect individual government 
officials for their own benefit,10 but rather to protect the rights of 
the people they represent.11  
The privilege to make defamatory statements is divided into 
two categories: absolute and qualified.12  Absolute privilege 
provides immunity to certain government officials, even when 
statements are knowingly false and expressly malicious.13  Qualified 
privilege provides immunity only upon a showing of good faith and 
lack of malice.14  Additionally, qualified privilege is destroyed if the 
privilege is abused.15  In determining what type of privilege, if any, 
to apply, courts must examine the consequences and benefits of 
limiting speech by certain government officials.  According to 
Judge Learned Hand, “As is so often the case, the answer must be 
 
personal liability for acts within the scope of their authority.”).  
 9. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 293. 
 10. Léon R. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech—Its Origin, 
Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960, 968 (1951) (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 
Mass. 1, 27 (1808)), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments 
/scr/treatise/immunity/99%20U.%20Pa.%20L.%20Rev.%20960%20(1951).pdf 
(explaining that instead of being secured for personal benefit, these privileges are 
secured to support the rights of the people by enabling their representatives to 
work without fear of civil or criminal prosecution); see also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 
564, 572–73 (1959) (“The privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, 
but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of 
government.”).  
 11. See infra note 56. 
 12. Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 180–183. 
 15. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115, 
at 832 (5th ed. 1984) (“[Qualified] immunity is forfeited if the defendant steps 
outside of the scope of the privilege, or abuses the occasion.”); see also Matthis, 243 
Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d at 416 (“[A] qualified or conditional privilege grants 
immunity only if the privilege is not abused and defamatory statements are 
publicized in good faith and without malice.”).  The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides four ways qualified privilege may be abused:  
[1] because of the publisher’s knowledge or reckless disregard as to the 
falsity of the defamatory matter; [2] because the defamatory matter is 
published for some purpose other than that for which the particular 
privilege is given; [3] because the publication is made to some person 
not reasonably believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the 
purpose of the particular privilege; or [4] because the publication 
includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed to be necessary to 
accomplish the purpose for which the occasion is privileged.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 599 cmt. a (1977) (citations omitted).  
3
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found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either 
alternative.”16 
Because absolute privilege comes at the cost of denying relief 
to victims of intentionally malicious defamatory statements,17 
absolute privilege was historically limited to members of the U.S. 
Congress and the highest legislative bodies of a state.18  In the last 
thirty years, however, a growing trend has evolved in favor of 
expanding absolute privilege to subordinate government officials.19  
During this period, Minnesota has consistently declined to adopt 
this broad application of privilege.20 
Recently, in Zutz v. Nelson,21 the Minnesota Supreme Court was 
faced with the decision to maintain its minority stance or join the 
growing majority.  Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
declined to adopt the majority position on the issue, holding that 
qualified, rather than absolute, privilege is appropriate for 
subordinate government officials.22 
This case note first outlines the origins and development of 
absolute privilege.23  It then details the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
holding in Zutz,24 followed by an analysis of the decision.25  Finally, 
the note concludes by asserting that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
continues to strike the right balance between two important, 
competing public interests by maintaining its minority stance on 
privilege.26 
II. HISTORY 
This Part first discusses the tension between the two competing 
policies of free, uninhibited political speech, and providing a 
 
 16. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 162–166. 
 18. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c (1938). 
 19. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2010) (Anderson, Paul H., 
J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c (1977); cf. 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c (1938) (reflecting the majority rule of 
that era). 
 20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. C, reporter’s note (1977) 
(listing Minnesota among jurisdictions not extending absolute privilege to 
subordinate legislative bodies). 
 21. 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 2010). 
 22. Id. at 63. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part III. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See infra Part V. 
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remedy for the tort of defamation.  It then traces the origins of 
absolute privilege, how that privilege has expanded across various 
jurisdictions, and Minnesota’s minority stance on the issue. 
A. The Tension Between Uninhibited Political Speech and Defamation 
The drafters of the U.S. Constitution established a legacy of 
condemning the practice of prosecuting individuals for speech, 
especially speech that is critical of government or government 
officials.27  However, absolute freedom of speech for everyone, 
under all circumstances, is simply untenable.28  Courts must make 
value judgments as to what speech is protected, under what 
circumstances, and when and how the government can regulate 
speech.29  Informing these judgments are the underlying goals of 
free speech: furthering self-governance and aiding the discovery of 
truth via the “marketplace of ideas.”30 
Political speech is at the core of what is protected by the U.S. 
Constitution.31  Effective self-governance is rooted in the principle 
that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”32  Freedom of speech allows voters to make informed 
decisions, influence policy makers, and check abuse of power by 
public officials by voting those members out of office.33 
Freedom of speech is also thought to be essential for the 
discovery of truth.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued, “[T]he 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted 
in the competition of the market . . . .”34  The notion behind this 
so-called “marketplace of ideas” metaphor is that the remedy for 
false speech is “more speech, not enforced silence.”35  There is much 
 
 27. See William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of 
Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 113–14 (1984). 
 28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 925. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See id. at 926.  
 31. Id. at 927; see also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–17 (2011) 
(discussing what constitutes political speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 273–74 (1964) (stating, in obiter dictum, that the “central meaning of the 
First Amendment” is to allow criticism of government and government officials). 
 32. N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270. 
 33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 926. 
 34. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 35. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
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flawed about this metaphor—namely, that it erroneously 
presupposes that everyone is equal and that access to the 
ideological marketplace is free from imposed boundaries.36  But, 
giving government the power to decide what is true and right—and 
the power to suppress all else—would be much worse.37  Therefore, 
until a better method is introduced, free speech is the best way to 
discover the truth.38  Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in 
Whitney v. California, offers a compelling explanation for protecting 
freedom of speech:  
Those who won our independence believed . . . that 
public discussion is a political duty; and that this should 
be a fundamental principle of the American government.  
They recognized the risks to which all human institutions 
are subject.  But they knew that order cannot be secured 
merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that 
it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and 
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression 
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that 
the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely 
supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the 
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.  Believing in 
the power of reason as applied through public discussion, 
they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of 
force in its worst form.  Recognizing the occasional 
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the 
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be 
guaranteed.39 
However, alongside these benefits, free speech has the potential to 
cause devastating consequences.  Victims of defamatory speech, for 
example, are subject to hatred, ridicule, obloquy, and contempt.40  
Defamatory speech is a published, false statement that 
disparages another by reflecting unfavorably upon his personal 
morality or integrity, or discrediting his financial standing in the 
 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
 36. For an extraordinary critique of the marketplace of ideas metaphor 
through the lens of white privilege and racism, see generally Cedric Merlin Powell, 
The Mythological Marketplace of Ideas: R.A.V., Mitchell, and Beyond, 12 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (1995). 
 37. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 926. 
 38. See id. at 928–29 (citing MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
1–12 (1984)). 
 39. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375–76. 
 40. DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 1:7 (2010). 
6
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community.41  Defamation necessarily involves the element of 
disgrace.42  Therefore, while calling someone a Republican may 
arouse adverse feelings toward him by Democrats, and even 
diminish him in their esteem, it lacks the necessary element of 
personal disgrace to be considered defamation.43  
The law provides a remedy for the very real damage caused by 
false, defamatory statements.44  The interest in protecting one’s 
reputation against the personally crushing and career-ending 
potential of defamatory speech provides one occasion to place 
limits on free, uninhibited speech.45  As long as the law protects 
both reputational interests and free speech interests, there will be a 
perpetual balancing of these two competing policies.46  
B. The Origins and Development of Absolute Privilege 
Absolute privilege is granted to various officials in all three 
branches of government.  The Middle Snake Watershed District 
Board at issue in Zutz falls under the legislative branch.  As such, 
this Part focuses on absolute privilege in the legislative branch, 
followed by a brief discussion of absolute privilege in the judicial 
and executive branches.  
1. Legislative Privilege 
Members of the U.S. Congress enjoy the absolute privilege of 
free, uninhibited speech.47  This privilege is fundamental to our 
democratic system of government.48  Officially originating in the 
Parliament of England in 1688,49 absolute privilege was established 
 
 41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 559 cmt. b (1977). 
 42. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 111, at 773. 
 43. Id.  Nor is it defamatory to impute to someone perfectly legitimate 
conduct in which one is entitled to engage.  ELDER, supra note 40, § 1:7.  Thus, it is 
not defamatory to state that a city council member played golf with a developer, 
Riley v. Moyed, 529 A.2d 248, 253 (Del. 1987), or that a plaintiff declined to be 
interviewed by the media, Brewer v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 636, 643 
(Tex. App. 1998), or that a legislator voted otherwise than he had on expenditures 
and taxes, Tatur v. Solsrud, 498 N.W.2d 232, 234–35 (Wis. 1993). 
 44. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Minn. 2010). 
 45. See SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 1:21. 
 46. See id. (pointing out the constant trade-offs between free expression and 
reputation). 
 47. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 961–62. 
 48. Id. 
 49. It is unclear exactly when legislative immunity for parliamentary speech 
was officially granted in England.  See id. at 962–64.  Until what the English call 
7
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to maintain an independent legislative branch of government, free 
from the prerogatives of the King.50  Similarly, the drafters of the 
U.S. Constitution recognized the value of an independent 
legislative branch and thus ratified what is referred to as the speech 
or debate clause: 
[Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, 
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be 
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the 
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and 
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in 
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other 
Place.51 
Every state has affirmed this principle by including provisions 
similar to the speech or debate clause in their state constitutions.52  
In so doing, state senators and representatives enjoy absolute 
privilege, just like members of Congress, to make defamatory 
statements with impunity.53  For example, the Minnesota 
Constitution provides, “For any speech or debate in either house 
[members of each house] shall not be questioned in any other 
place.”54  
The justification for absolute legislative privilege lies not in a 
 
“the glorious Revolution” in 1688, any privilege to speak with impunity was 
considered an act of grace by the King.  Id. at 963.  At the beginning of every 
session of Parliament, the Speaker of the House of Commons requested the right 
to speak with impunity, along with other rights (such as access to the King), which 
the King granted.  Id.  Section 19 of the Bill of Rights, granted by William and 
Mary, stated, “That the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in 
Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of 
Parliament.”  Id. at 964. 
 50. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 962.  During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, 
members of the House of Commons who attempted to discuss matters in 
Parliament distasteful to the crown often found themselves confined to the Tower 
of London.  Comment, Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 
125, 126 (1973). 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 52. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 965; see, e.g., MASS. CONST., Declaration of 
Rights, art. XXI (“The freedom of deliberation, speech and debate, in either 
house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of the people, that it cannot be 
the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or complaint, in any other 
court or place whatsoever.”).  Interestingly, in Hawaii, state legislators enjoy a 
greater privilege than the privilege granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution.  
See Abercrombie v. McClung, 525 P.2d 594, 597 (Haw. 1974) (holding that a state 
legislator was privileged for statements made outside the legislative process). 
 53. ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 8:2.2 (4th ed. 2011). 
 54. MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10.  
8
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desire to protect individual legislators for their own benefit.55  But 
rather, by enabling legislators to conduct the functions of their 
office without fear, the rights of the people are protected.56  
The notion that “the public” is protected when legislators are 
given absolute privilege to make maliciously false defamatory 
statements is supported by two main arguments.  First, in order to 
govern effectively, officials must be able to devote their full time 
and attention to the responsibilities of their office without being 
tied up in litigation.57  Any litigation arising out of the performance 
of official duties impairs officials from performing duties that are of 
importance to the public.58 
Next, it is suggested that any threat of liability for actions taken 
within the scope of their authority will cause responsible 
government officials to perform their duties more timidly.59  If a 
legislator is inhibited from freely disclosing facts, it limits the 
public’s access to the truth.60  And, as discussed above, it is access to 
the truth which ensures the functioning of our democracy by 
allowing voters to make informed decisions, influence policy 
makers, and check abuse of power by public officials by voting 
 
 55. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 968 (quoting Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 
(1808)); see also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1959) (“The privilege is not 
a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to 
aid in the effective functioning of government.”).  
 56. James Wilson, one of the principal architects of the federal Constitution’s 
speech or debate clause, stated: 
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick [sic] to 
discharge his publick [sic] trust with firmness and success, it is 
indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, 
and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, 
however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion 
offence. 
1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (R. McCloskey ed., 1967), cited in Richard D. 
Batchelder, Jr., Chastain v. Sundquist: A Narrow Reading of the Doctrine of Legislative 
Immunity, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 384, 386 (1990). 
 57. Developments in the Law, Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 918 (1956). 
 58. Absolute Immunity, supra note 8, at 590; Defamation, supra note 57, at 918. 
 59. See Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 
F.2d 289, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The nation’s welfare is dependent upon officials 
who are willing to speak forthrightly and disclose violations of the law and other 
activities contrary to the public interest.  Their voices will be stilled if they perceive 
or fear that the person involved has the resources or disposition to defend with all 
affirmative tactics.  When millions may turn on regulatory decisions, there is a 
strong incentive to counterattack.”); see also Absolute Immunity, supra note 8, at 590 
(detailing the policy arguments for and against this broad immunity). 
 60. Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d at 293. 
9
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those members out of office.61 
This privilege for legislators to speak and debate is absolute.62  
This means that even when statements are knowingly false and 
expressly malicious, no liability can be imposed.63  That being said, 
it is not difficult to imagine the injustice that abuse of this privilege 
makes possible.64  Presumably, the drafters of the U.S. Constitution 
were aware of the abuses that could flow from safeguards that are 
too sweeping.65  However, the public benefits derived from open 
communication by Congress were, and are, thought to be sufficient 
to outweigh the policy in favor of compensating victims of 
defamation.66  
In an attempt to curb abuses, however, the scope of absolute 
legislative privilege has generally remained limited to actions that 
are related to law making and the legislative process itself.67  
Accordingly, the test when determining whether the speech or 
debate clause applies is whether or not the activity qualifies as a 
“legislative act.”68  
To illustrate, in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, Senator Proxmire made 
allegedly defamatory statements about Richard Hutchinson’s 
 
 61. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. 
 62. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 967. 
 63. Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416–17 (1954). 
 64. See Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 50, at 127 (offering 
an in−depth analysis of legislative immunity); Yankwich, supra note 10, at 973 
(referring to possible abuse of privileges). 
 65. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972). 
 66. Absolute Immunity, supra note 8, at 589–90; see also Van Vechten Veeder, 
Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 463, 467 
(1909) (“Any principle that is universal in its application may sometimes be harsh 
in its consequences.  But where the reasons on which it is based are plain and 
unmistakable, individual interest must yield to the commanding dictates of public 
policy.”). 
 67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. a (1977) (“The privilege 
does not protect a legislator who in private or public discussion outside of his 
legislative function explains his reasons for voting on past, pending or proposed 
legislation or who otherwise discusses the legislation, or who engages in other 
activities incidentally related to legislative affairs but not a part of the legislative 
process itself.”); see also Chastain v. Sundquist, 833 F.2d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(“The Speech or Debate Clause protects all lawmaking activities undertaken in the 
House and Senate, but affords no constitutional immunity beyond its carefully 
defined scope.”). 
 68. See Michael R. Seghetti, Speech or Debate Immunity: Preserving Legislative 
Independence While Cutting Costs of Congressional Immunity, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
589, 594 (1985) (pointing out that courts generally have not extended protection 
to the conduct of congressmen beyond the walls of Congress). 
10
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research in a newsletter.69  Proxmire argued that informing his 
constituents was an essential part of his duties as a member of 
Congress and that this communication, therefore, should be 
protected.70  The Court disagreed.71  While Proxmire’s statements 
would have been protected if made in the Senate, they were not 
protected in the context of published newsletters or press 
releases.72  Private publication of defamatory matter is simply not 
“essential to the deliberations of the Senate,” nor is it a part of the 
deliberative process.73  
The Court in Proxmire concluded that the drafters of the U.S. 
Constitution did not make a conscious choice to grant immunity 
for “defamatory statements scattered far and wide by mail, press, 
and the electronic media.”74  Thus, absolute privilege was not 
extended to activities that merely relate to the legislative process.  
2. Judicial Privilege 
The U.S. Supreme Court extended absolute privilege to judges 
in 1871.75  The policy of granting judicial privilege is rooted in a 
nearly identical philosophy to that of granting legislative privilege: 
 
 69. 443 U.S. 111, 116 (1979).  Senator Proxmire awarded the funders of 
Hutchinson’s research his so-called “Golden Fleece of the Month” award for what 
he perceived to be the most egregious example of wasteful governmental spending 
that month.  Id. at 114.  Hutchinson was developing an objective measure of 
aggression by studying how certain animals clench their jaws in response to 
aggravating stimuli.  Id. at 115.  
 70. Id. at 124. 
 71. Id. at 130.  The Court came to this conclusion after surveying the existing 
case law on the matter.  E.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1973) (“A 
Member of Congress may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker’s 
stand in his home district, and clearly the Speech or Debate Clause would not 
protect such an act even though the libel was read from an official committee 
report.  The reason is that republishing a libel under such circumstances is not an 
essential part of the legislative process and is not part of that deliberative process 
‘by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings.’”); Gravel v. 
United States, 408 U.S 606, 625 (1972) (“[P]rivate publication by Senator Gravel . 
. . was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate; nor does questioning 
as to private publication threaten the integrity or independence of the Senate by 
impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence.”). 
 72. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 130. 
 73. Id.; see also 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 329 (1833) 
(“Therefore, although a speech delivered in the house of commons is privileged, 
and the member cannot be questioned respecting it elsewhere; yet, if he publishes 
his speech, and it contains libelous matter, he is liable to an action and 
prosecution therefor, as in common cases of libel.”). 
 74. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 132. 
 75. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871).  
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that the truth can best be determined and justice can best be 
served by encouraging maximum freedom of communication.76  
Again, it is important to note that this privilege was not created for 
the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but 
rather for the benefit of the public, whose interest is that judges be 
at liberty to exercise their functions with independence, and 
without fear of consequences.77 
Today, this privilege applies to nearly all participants in a 
judicial proceeding.78  It is seen as indispensable to the public 
interest that attorneys, jurors, witnesses, parties, and judges be able 
to speak freely and fearlessly, uninfluenced by the possibility of 
being brought to account in an action for defamation.79  
3. Executive Privilege 
Absolute privilege was judicially extended to the executive 
branch in the late nineteenth century.80  Relying on an analogy to 
judicial privilege, the U.S. Supreme Court in Spalding v. Vilas held 
that the head of a federal executive department was absolutely 
privileged to make defamatory statements, as long as the comments 
were made while acting within his official capacity.81  
Spalding, the Postmaster General, accused the plaintiff, a 
lawyer, of being a “common swindler.”82  While the words were 
allegedly published with malicious intent,83 the Court granted 
absolute privilege in a desire to best serve the public interest.84  The 
Court concluded that “it would seriously cripple the proper and 
 
 76. Handler & Klein, supra note 3, at 55.  
 77. Bradley, 80 U.S at 349.  Similarly to legislators, defamation suits against 
judges might impinge upon their time at the public’s expense.  Batchelder, Jr., 
supra note 56, at 392.  
 78. Handler & Klein, supra note 3, at 55; see also Veeder, supra note 66, at 474 
(citing Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. 1 (1869)) (upholding privilege from liability for 
a juror who, in the consultation room, asserted that the plaintiff was a liar and had 
defrauded an insurance company).  
 79. Veeder, supra note 66, at 465.  It is also thought that unsuccessful suits 
against judges might constitute a serious drain on their time.  Handler & Klein, 
supra note 3, at 53. 
 80. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).  For an informative history of the 
development of executive privilege in England, see Arno C. Becht, The Absolute 
Privilege of the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1127, 1127–35 (1961–1962). 
 81. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 488–89. 
 82. Id. at 486. 
 83. Id.  Because absolute privilege disposes of this case, it is never determined 
whether or not actual malice was present.  See Becht, supra note 80, at 1127–35. 
 84. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498; see also Batchelder, Jr., supra note 56, at 393. 
12
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effective administration of public affairs” if high-ranking executive 
officials were subject to apprehension of liability for acts taken 
under the limits of their authority.85  Following the holding in 
Spalding, states have extended executive privilege to high-ranking 
state executive officials, such as the governor, the attorney general, 
or the heads of state departments whose rank is the equivalent of 
cabinet rank in the federal government.86 
C. Expanding the Scope of Privilege 
Approximately sixty years after Spalding, in the landmark case 
of Barr v. Matteo, the Supreme Court altered the legal landscape by 
extending absolute privilege to low-level federal executive 
officials.87  In Barr, employees of the Federal Office of Rent 
Stabilization sued the acting director for defamatory statements 
contained in a press release, which criticized the employees’ 
actions in devising and implementing a budgetary plan that had 
come under congressional attack.88  
The Court in Barr departed from the traditional rank-based 
rule and greatly broadened the scope of immunized activity by 
adopting a “functional approach” to determine immunity.89  The 
Court concluded that privilege should not depend on the rank of 
the government official, but rather on the duties involved in that 
particular office.90  In making this analytical shift, the Court clearly 
intended to extend the parameters of absolute privilege:  
We do not think that the principle announced in 
[Spalding v.] Vilas can properly be restricted to executive 
officers of cabinet rank . . . . The privilege is not a badge 
or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a 
policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of 
government.91  
In the fifty years since the Barr decision, “[L]ower federal courts 
have extended immunity to public officials of virtually every rank.”92  
 
 85. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498. 
 86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591 cmt. c (1977). 
 87. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).  
 88. Id. at 565–67. 
 89. Batchelder, Jr., supra note 56, at 393.  
 90. Barr, 360 U.S. at 573–74. 
 91. Id. at 572–73. 
 92. Batchelder, Jr., supra note 56, at 393 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 
(1983)) (NASA center director); see also Strothman v. Gefreh, 739 F.2d 515 (10th 
Cir. 1984) (administrative law judges); George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103 (4th Cir. 
13
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The modern trend in federal jurisdictions appears to favor free 
speech over the rights of the defamed.93  
Many state courts have followed suit.94  By the time Zutz v. 
Nelson was decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in 2010, the 
majority of state jurisdictions were using this new functional 
analysis to extend absolute privilege to individuals in lower-level 
government positions.95  Within Minnesota, courts have repeatedly 
faced the decision of whether to join this growing trend, or 
maintain the “narrow limits” Minnesota has placed on absolute 
privilege since it became a state.96  
D. Minnesota’s Minority Stance 
For over a century, whether or not a government official in 
Minnesota enjoyed absolute privilege depended on the rank of his 
or her position.97  Because absolute privilege provides immunity to 
those who make intentionally false and malicious statements, 
 
1980) (postal inspector); Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. 
Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Smithsonian 
department chairman); Mandel v. Nouse, 509 F.2d 1031 (6th Cir. 1975) (Army 
commander); Sowders v. Damron, 457 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1972) (Internal 
Revenue Service officers). 
 93. See sources cited supra note 92. 
 94. See, e.g., McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966) (conforming to Saxon 
v. Knowles, 185 So. 2d 194 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)); Larson v. Donner, 178 
N.E.2d 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961); Baker v. Couchman, 729 N.W.2d 520 (Mich. 
2007); Bd. of Educ. v. Buffalo Council of Supervisors, 383 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y. 
1976); Catalina v. Crawford, 483 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
 95. Interestingly, authorities are inconsistent on which stance is, in fact, the 
majority.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c. (1977) 
(recognizing that the majority of jurisdictions extend absolute privilege to 
subordinate legislative bodies), with KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 114, at 821 (“A 
scant majority have held that [subordinate legislative] proceedings are not within 
the policy underlying the immunity, and that the members of such bodies are 
sufficiently protected by a qualified privilege in the exercise of good faith.”) 
(emphasis added), and 2 SMOLLA, supra note 2, § 8:25 (“The decisions appear to 
be about evenly divided between those holding that an absolute privilege applies 
to members of [subordinate legislative] bodies, and those holding that only a 
qualified privilege applies.”).  However, it is rather certain that the growing trend 
is to expand immunity.  See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 69 n.1 (Minn. 2010) 
(Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting). 
 96. See, e.g., Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982) (citing 
Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954)). 
 97. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 62; see, e.g., Bauer v. State, 511 N.W.2d 447, 450 
(Minn. 1994) (declining to extend absolute privilege to mid-level state employees 
acting in their official capacities); Jones v. Monico, 276 Minn. 371, 375, 150 
N.W.2d 213, 215–16 (1967) (declining to extend absolute privilege to a member 
of a county board). 
14
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Minnesota has a history of confining this privilege within “narrow 
limits.”98  Absolute privilege in Minnesota has been historically 
limited to high-ranking judicial,99 legislative,100 and executive101 
officials.  
The notion of extending absolute privilege to members of 
subordinate government bodies—such as city councils, municipal 
councils, and county boards102—was first addressed in 1897, in 
Wilcox v. Moore.103  In Wilcox, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused 
to extend absolute privilege to members of a city council.104  Since 
then, Minnesota has consistently refused to extend absolute 
privilege beyond high-ranking legislative, judicial, and executive 
officials.105  Minnesota courts have determined that members of 
subordinate government bodies are sufficiently protected by 
qualified privilege.106 
In 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court departed from its 
bright-line, rank-based rule and extended absolute privilege to 
police officers for statements made in arrest reports in Carradine v. 
 
 98. Johnson, 315 N.W.2d at 220 (quoting Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223, 67 N.W.2d 
at 417). 
 99. Matthis, 243 Minn. at 223–24, 67 N.W.2d at 417; accord RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 585 (1977). 
 100. See MINN. CONST. art. IV, § 10 (granting absolute privilege to members of 
the legislature); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c, reporter’s note 
(1981).  The legislative privilege was extended in 1994 to the Regents of the 
University of Minnesota by reason of separation of powers.  Bd. of Regents of Univ. 
of Minn. v. Reid, 522 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]his instance is 
one in which the public’s right to know weighs more heavily [than a defamed 
individual’s right to seek compensation].”). 
 101. Johnson, 315 N.W.2d at 223 (extending absolute privilege to “top-level 
cabinet-type” executive officials).  The U.S. Supreme Court extended absolute 
privilege to high-level executive officials almost a century earlier in Spalding v. 
Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896).  
 102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c (1977). 
 103. 69 Minn. 49, 71 N.W. 917 (1897).   
 104. Id. at 52, 71 N.W. at 919.  The defendants in Wilcox accused a judge of 
activities “highly unbecoming a man.”  Id. at 51, 71 N.W. at 918. 
 105. In 1909, the court denied absolute privilege to a city council member who 
accused the plaintiff of “running nothing but a damn whorehouse.”  Burch v. 
Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211, 120 N.W. 33, 33 (1909).  In 1967, in Jones v. Monico, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court again held that subordinate government bodies, 
such as municipal councils or town meetings, were not protected by absolute 
privilege.  276 Minn. 371, 375–76, 150 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1967).  Almost 100 years 
after Wilcox, the court of appeals once more affirmed that Minnesota does not 
extend absolute immunity to city council members.  Johnson v. Northside 
Residents Redevelopment Council, 467 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).   
 106. Jones, 276 Minn. at 375, 150 N.W.2d at 216.  This position places 
Minnesota in the minority.  See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
15
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State.107  Police officers are not high-ranking executive officials,108 
but the court reasoned that any threat of defamation liability would 
“deter the honest officer from fearlessly and vigorously preparing a 
detailed, accurate report . . . .”109  In Carradine, the court granted 
absolute privilege because the policy of obtaining accurate police 
reports outweighed the policy of protecting the arrestee from 
potentially damaging defamatory statements.110  
Rather than treating police officers writing police reports as a 
narrow exception to the established rule, the Carradine court 
adopted a new two-factor analysis to justify its decision.111  To 
determine if absolute privilege was warranted, the court considered 
(1) the nature of the function assigned to the officer; and (2) the 
relationship of the statements to the performance of that 
function.112  
This left the Minnesota Supreme Court with the following 
dilemma: should Carradine be read broadly as creating a new rule 
to determine when absolute privilege applies?113  Or, should 
Carradine be read as a narrow exception to the existing rank-based 
rule, applicable only to police officers making arrest reports?114  
The answer would have to wait until Zutz v. Nelson, a case that 
involved the potential extension of absolute immunity to watershed 
 
 107. 511 N.W.2d 733, 736–37 (Minn. 1994). 
 108. Id. at 735. 
 109. Id. at 736.  This report is later used by the prosecutor to determine 
whether to charge the arrestee and, if so, for what offense(s).  Id.  Therefore, 
accurate arrest reports are essential to ensure justice for the accused.  Id. at 735–
36.  The report is also vital at trial, as it is used to refresh the officer’s memory and 
possibly impeach the officer.  Id. at 736.  Additionally, threat of liability may cause 
an officer to wait to bring up certain details until trial (under the judicial 
privilege), and thus submit the accused to “trial by surprise.”  Id.; see also Handler 
& Klein, supra note 3, at 59 (“[I]t is sound policy to ‘protect the honest 
communication of misinformation in order to insure the availability of correct 
information . . . .’” (quoting 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 5.25, at 437 (1956))). 
 110. Carradine, 511 N.W.2d at 736.  The court in Carradine made clear that 
should the police officer make statements beyond what was contained in the 
report, only a qualified privilege would apply.  Id. at 734; see also Redwood Cnty. 
Tel. Co. v. Luttman, 567 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
absolute privilege applied to statements made by a sheriff). 
 111. Carradine, 511 N.W.2d at 736. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Video of Oral Argument at 6:37, Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 
2010) (No. A08-1764) [hereinafter Oral Argument], available at 
http://www.tpt.org/courts/MNJudicialBranchvideo_NEW.php?number=A081764. 
(questioning from Justice Meyer regarding the scope of Carradine).  
 114. Id.  
16
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district board members.115 
III. THE ZUTZ DECISION 
The four parties involved in this suit were board members of 
the Middle Snake Tamarac Rivers Watershed District (hereinafter 
Middle Snake Watershed District) in northern Minnesota.116  
Watershed districts are created by statute “[t]o conserve the natural 
resources of the state by land use planning, flood control, and 
other conservation projects . . . .”117  These special-purpose units of 
local government operate in a “quasi-legislative capacity”118 and are 
given extensive authority, including the power of eminent 
domain,119 to carry out their operations.  Each watershed district in 
Minnesota is operated by a board ranging from three to nine 
managers,120 all appointed by the county commissioners of the 
counties served by the watershed district.121   
Two members of the Middle Snake Watershed District Board, 
Loren Zutz and Elden Elseth, suspected improprieties regarding 
payments to various district employees.122  Zutz and Elseth obtained 
the district’s bank records to further investigate the matter.123   
At a board meeting on June 18, 2007, John Nelson and Arlyn 
Stroble, two other board members, believed Zutz and Elseth’s 
investigation violated the Minnesota Government Data Practices 
Act124 and allegedly made statements to that effect.125  First, in 
 
 115. 788 N.W.2d at 59–60. 
 116. Id. at 60. 
 117. MINN. STAT. § 103D.201, subdiv. 1 (2010).  Watershed boards carry out 
specific purposes, such as, inter alia, controlling flood waters, diverting 
watercourses, regulating the use of ditches and watercourses, and regulating 
improvements by riparian property owners.  MINN. STAT. § 103D.201, subdiv. 2 
(2010). 
 118. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 60. 
 119. MINN. STAT. § 103D.335, subdivs. 1(3), 11 (2010). 
 120. Id. § 103D.205, subdiv. 2(b) (2010); Id. § 103D.225, subdiv. 4(a) (2010) 
(“The number of managers may not be less than three nor more than nine, except 
that a proposed watershed district entirely within the metropolitan area may not 
have fewer than five managers.”).  Board members serve three-year terms.  Id. § 
103D.315, subdiv. 6 (2010). 
 121. MINN. STAT. § 103D.311, subdiv. 2 (2010).  
 122. Brief of Appellants at 2, Zutz, 788 N.W.2d 58 (No. A08-1764).  Watershed 
District boards have authority to hire employees to facilitate “the works and 
improvements undertaken by the district.”  MINN. STAT. § 103D.325, subdiv. 3 
(2010). 
 123. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 60. 
 124. MINN. STAT. § 13.43 (2010).  For a discussion of the Minnesota 
Government Data Practices Act and the type of information to which the public 
17
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response to a question about whether Zutz and Elseth had violated 
Minnesota law, Nelson allegedly stated, “I don’t think there is 
much question that [they] did.”126  Nelson also allegedly stated, 
“Laws are being broken by Board Members—enough is enough!”127  
Finally, Stroble, implying that Zutz and Elseth violated Minnesota 
law, allegedly asked, “Why should we provide legal counsel for 
actions that are against the law?”128  After these accusations, a 
“lengthy and heated discussion” ensued.129 
Zutz and Elseth then brought an action against Nelson and 
Stroble for defamation.130  Nelson and Stroble raised absolute 
privilege as an affirmative defense and moved for judgment on the 
pleadings.131  The district court granted the motion, holding that 
Nelson and Stroble enjoyed absolute privilege from defamation 
claims, and the complaint was dismissed.132  
Zutz and Elseth appealed on the grounds that Minnesota law 
does not grant absolute privilege to subordinate bodies such as 
watershed district boards.133  However, relying primarily on the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Carradine v. State,134 the 
court of appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, reasoning that 
the public interest is best served by “open, frank communication 
from district board members.”135 
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.136  The 
court declined to read Carradine as a new way of analyzing absolute 
privilege.137  Instead, the court saw Carradine as supporting the 
traditional rule in Minnesota: that absolute immunity is only 
 
has access, see Paul R. Hannah, Minnesota Data Practices Act, in MINNESOTA 
INSTITUTE OF LEGAL EDUCATION, MEDIA LAW: DEFAMATION/GOVERNMENT DATA AND 
RELATED ISSUES 1 (1995). 
 125. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 61.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Watershed District Board Meeting Minutes, 3 (June 18, 2007) 
[hereinafter Meeting Minutes], available at http://www.mstrwd.com/wp-
content/uploads/07-06r2.min_2.DOC.   
 130. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 61.  The meeting, which commenced at 7:00 p.m., did 
not adjourn until approximately 12:48 a.m.  Meeting Minutes, supra note 129, at 8. 
 131. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 61. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. 511 N.W.2d 733, 735–36 (Minn. 1994). 
 135. Zutz v. Nelson, No. A08-1764, 2009 WL 1752139, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 16, 2009). 
 136. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 66. 
 137. Id. at 63. 
18
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granted to high-ranking officials, and any extension beyond high-
ranking government officials is treated as an exception to the rule, 
based on public policy.138  Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court concluded that limiting watershed district board members to 
qualified immunity “better serves the people of Minnesota.”139 
The court provided three main reasons for this conclusion.  
First, extending absolute privilege is not—and should not be—
done lightly,140 as it provides immunity for potentially devastating 
defamatory speech141 without adequate recourse.142  Second, the 
court concluded that members of these bodies are sufficiently 
protected by qualified privilege.143  Third, the court found that the 
defendants did not produce a sufficiently compelling reason to 
overrule long-standing Minnesota precedent.144  
The case law in Minnesota, while perhaps not a model of 
clarity,145 is relatively consistent in refusing to extend absolute 
immunity to subordinate government bodies.146  Holding otherwise 
would mark a departure from Minnesota’s stance on the issue.147  
Ultimately, the court—in spite of the dissent’s urging148—refused to 
make the shift.149  Watershed district board members enjoy a 
qualified, not absolute, privilege to make defamatory statements in 
 
 138. Id. at 65–66 (citing Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 
413, 417 (1954)). 
 139. Id. at 63.  During oral argument, Justice Dietzen expressed concern that 
the unintended consequences of broadly extending absolute privilege were not 
sufficiently considered by the lower courts.  Oral Argument, supra note 113, at 
16:32. 
 140. Oral Argument, supra note 113, at 29:15 (questioning from Chief Justice 
Gildea); cf. Burch v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211–12, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909) 
(declining to extend absolute privilege to a city council member). 
 141. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 62.  “[D]efamatory speech . . . can be personally 
crushing and career-ending.”  Id. at 64. 
 142. Id. at 65; see also infra text accompanying notes 162–66. 
 143. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 62–63 (citing Jones v. Monico, 276 Minn. 371, 375, 
150 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1967)). 
 144. Id. at 64.  Overruling Minnesota precedent requires a “compelling 
reason” to do so.  State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009) (quoting State 
v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005)). 
 145. See Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 63 n.2 (admitting the presence of confusing 
statements in Minnesota common law).  
 146. Id. at 63; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 590 cmt. c, reporter’s 
note (1977). 
 147. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 63. 
 148. Id. at 73 (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting) (“[A] change in Minnesota’s 
law regarding absolute legislative privilege should be made in this case.”). 
 149. Id. at 66 (majority opinion). 
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Minnesota.150   
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ZUTZ DECISION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed Minnesota’s place 
in the minority by deciding that qualified, not absolute, privilege 
applies to members of watershed district boards.151  This Part first 
discusses how the Zutz ruling strikes a better balance between the 
competing policies of free, uninhibited speech and providing relief 
to victims of intentionally malicious defamatory statements when it 
comes to subordinate government officials.152  It then discusses how 
Zutz provides a more certain, and thus preferable, test in 
determining the applicability of absolute or qualified privilege.153  
A. The Zutz Rule Strikes a Better Balance Between Competing Interests 
Extending absolute privilege to essentially all levels of 
government without limit strikes the wrong balance between the 
competing interest of free, uninhibited debate and the often 
irreparable damage caused by leaving victims of unbridled 
defamatory statements without an adequate opportunity for 
redress.154  Cases granting such extension generally fail to fully 
explore the complete ramifications of expanding immunity.155  
This section first discusses why absolute privilege is not 
appropriate for subordinate government officials.156  It then 
discusses why these subordinate officials are sufficiently protected 
by qualified privilege.157 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id.  
 152. See infra Part IV.A. 
 153. See infra Part IV.B. 
 154. See Zutz, 788 N.W.2d. at 65; see also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 585 
(1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the modern rule “can only have 
the added effect of deterring the desirable public discussion of all aspects of our 
Government and the conduct of its officials”); ELDER, supra note 40, § 2:13 
(explaining that the expansion of absolute privilege has been “criticized . . . by 
most legal commentators”).  But see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 
1949) (“[I]t has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs 
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the 
constant dread of retaliation.”). 
 155. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 578 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Oral Argument, supra 
note 113, at 16:32. 
 156. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 157. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
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1. Absolute Privilege is Not Appropriate for Subordinate Government 
Officials  
There are three primary reasons why absolute privilege is not 
appropriate for unelected, volunteer watershed district board 
members.  First, these officials are not directly accountable to the 
public in the way high-level elected officials are.158  Elected 
members of Congress play a unique role in the effective 
functioning of a democratic government.159  Senators and 
Representatives are sent by their constituents to represent the 
collective will of the people.160  While these legislators are given 
absolute privilege to participate in free, uninhibited speech and 
debate, they are also subject to the checks and balances of the 
voters who guard against abuse of power by retaining the ability to 
vote these members out of office.161  
Because absolute privilege deprives individuals of a remedy for 
wrongdoing, “[it] should be bestowed only when and at the level 
necessary.”162  A key element to consider in determining whether 
absolute immunity strikes the right balance is the availability of 
alternate remedies for victims of defamation.163  Even if an official 
with absolute privilege cannot be sued, victims of defamation—or 
citizens who believe the official is abusing his or her privilege—can 
obtain adequate redress by voting that person out of office.  
However, citizens who disapprove of the actions of watershed 
district boards cannot vote those members out of office.164  Nor can 
these citizens necessarily vote out of office those who appointed 
 
 158. See Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 64–65. 
 159. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and 
House of Representatives.”). 
 160. See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404–05 (1819) (“The government 
of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people.  In 
form, and in substance, it emanates from them.  Its powers are granted by them, 
and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.”). 
 161. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 926. 
 162. Chamberlain v. Mathis, 729 P.2d 905, 912 (Ariz. 1986) (quoting Grimm v. 
Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227, 1232 (Ariz. 1977)). 
 163. See Recent Cases, 37 MINN. L. REV. 139, 142 (1952–1953); see also Freier v. 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 197, 356 N.W.2d 724, 733 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (expanding 
absolute privilege to school board members in decisions to discharge teachers was 
justified, in part, because of the adequate remedies of judicial review and 
reinstatement with back pay available to potentially defamed teachers).  Veeder, 
supra note 66, at 470–71 (discussing various alternate remedies for victims of 
privileged defamation and their importance). 
 164. Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn. 2010). 
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these board members.165  The majority in Zutz appropriately rejects 
the dissent’s argument that “public scrutiny and criticism” 
sufficiently hold such subordinate government officials 
accountable.166  
Second, if all government officials could make blatantly false, 
defamatory statements without inhibition, members of the general 
public may hesitate to voice opinions about these officials for fear 
of an unrestrained counterattack.167  Imagine, for example, that 
zoning board members enjoyed absolute privilege to defame.168  A 
citizen making an appeal to the board might hesitate before 
speaking, to prevent an unrestrained counterattack to his 
character.169  While public policy favors high-level members of the 
executive branch, legislature, and judiciary enjoying the fullest 
liberty of speech,170 unelected, volunteer members of a watershed 
district board ought not to enjoy such unbridled liberty.171 
Finally, Minnesota already imposes various limitations on one’s 
ability to recover for defamation, making it relatively difficult to 
recover for defamation in Minnesota.172  Therefore, subordinate 
governmental officials already enjoy substantial security from 
defamation suits.173  As such, additional protection for government 




 165. Id. at 64–65. 
 166. Id. at 65. 
 167. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 585 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).  Chief 
Justice Warren believed such an expansion would wrongly serve to “sanctify the 
powerful and silence debate.”  Id.; see also Bruce Jones, Qualified Immunity for Federal 
Officials: A Proposed Standard for Defamation Cases, 58 TEX. L. REV. 789, 797–98 
(1980) (discussing the negative ramifications of absolute privilege). 
 168. See Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 65. 
 169. See id. 
 170. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 72 (Anderson, Paul H., J., dissenting) (citing 2 WORKS 
OF JAMES WILSON 38 (James De Witt Andrews ed., 1896)). 
 171. Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 65. 
 172. See, e.g., Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 
1996) (holding that damages for emotional distress “are not compensable absent 
[proof of actual] harm to reputation”); see also Longbehn v. Schoenrock, 727 
N.W.2d 153, 160–62 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing the requirements for 
special damages, general damages, and punitive damages in a defamation claim). 
 173. See Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 28. 
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2. Subordinate Government Officials Are Sufficiently Protected by 
Qualified Privilege 
Uninhibited speech promotes the discovery of truth and the 
maintenance of an effective democracy.174  However, the 
consequences of providing unelected citizens absolute freedom of 
speech ought to be examined more closely before absolute 
privilege is extended.175  The notion that absolute privilege is 
essential at all levels of government for effective democracy 
“manifest[s] an unfortunate tendency to be mesmerized by 
resounding phrases and to ignore the fallibility of a priori notions 
about psychological phenomena.”176  The Zutz court debunked the 
popular notion that nothing less than absolute privilege is 
sufficient to ensure the free flow of information in subordinate 
legislative proceedings.177  Considering the two competing interests 
at stake, many courts178 and commentators179 have concluded that 
lower-level government officials are sufficiently protected by 
qualified privilege. 
Qualified privilege allows subordinate government officials to 
vigorously carry out their official duties without entirely eliminating 
protection against intentionally false statements made with 
 
 174. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 926.  
 175. See Handler & Klein, supra note 3, at 50 n.24; see also Laura Oren, 
Immunity and Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 935, 984 n.204 (1989) (“In other contexts courts have found that similarly 
dire predictions [of the consequences of qualified privilege] were not borne out 
by events.”). 
 176. Handler & Klein, supra note 3, at 50 n.24. 
 177. See id. at 52. 
 178. E.g., Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2010); Jones v. Monico, 
276 Minn. 371, 375, 150 N.W.2d 213, 216 (1967); Johnson v. Northside Residents 
Redevelopment Council, 467 N.W.2d 826, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); see also 
Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1460–61 (4th Cir. 1996) (Michael, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the public should be protected against false and 
malicious publication); Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 157–
62 (Alaska 1987); Browning v. Birmingham News, 348 So. 2d 455, 458 (Ala. 1977); 
Chamberlain v. Mathis, 729 P.2d 905, 910–14 (Ariz. 1986); Williams v. Fischer, 581 
N.E.2d 744, 745–46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Chapman, J., concurring); Lanier v. 
Higgins, 623 S.W.2d 914, 915–16 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Stukuls v. State, 366 N.E.2d 
829, 833 (N.Y. 1977). 
 179. ELDER, supra note 40, § 2:13 n.17 (citing L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF 
DEFAMATION 397–402 (1978)); KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 114, at 822–23; 
Absolute Immunity, supra note 8, at 594 (“[Qualified privilege] would insure that 
public officials would not use their offices for personal vendettas or in bad faith . . 
. .”). 
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malice.180  Subordinate government officials are protected against 
the consequences of honest mistakes, but will be held liable for 
comments made “from ill will and improper motives, or causelessly 
and wantonly for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff.”181  
Furthermore, qualified privilege can be lost if statements are not 
made in furtherance of the purpose that the privilege protects182 or 
if the privilege is abused.183  As such, the fear of an unrestrained 
counterattack is diminished, and citizens will be more apt to speak 
out against subordinate officials.184  When it comes to subordinate 
government officials, qualified privilege strikes the appropriate 
balance between promoting free, uninhibited speech and 
providing a mechanism for direct accountability to the citizens they 
serve.  
Proponents of extending absolute immunity claim that 
exposing subordinate government officials to potential litigation 
will have a chilling effect on the free and open debate required to 
serve the public interest.185  However, this statement is “an 
exceedingly questionable assumption for which there is little or no 
empirical or other support.”186  Since Minnesota became a state, 
subordinate government officials have enjoyed qualified, rather 
than absolute, privilege.187  There is no evidence that a lack of 
 
 180. See Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 564, 586 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Zutz, 788 N.W.2d at 66; Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 222–23, 67 N.W.2d 
413, 416 (1954). 
 181. Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Minn. 2009) (quoting 
Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Minn. 1980)). 
 182. KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, § 115, at 834. 
 183. See supra note 15. 
 184. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 584–85 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).  Chief 
Justice Warren believed such an expansion would wrongly serve to “sanctify the 
powerful and silence debate.”  Id. at 585; see also Jones, supra note 167, at 797–98 
(discussing the negative ramifications of absolute privilege). 
 185. Barr, 360 U.S. at 575 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 
(1951)); see also Barr 360 U.S. at 577 (Black, J., concurring); Gregoire v. Biddle, 
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).  But see Howard, 360 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“[I]t is stretching the argument pretty far to say that the mere inquiry 
into malice would have worse consequences than the possibility of actual malice 
(which we would not, for a minute, condone).”). 
 186. ELDER, supra note 1540, § 2:13 (footnote omitted); see also Howard, 360 
U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (declaring this assumption a “gossamer web 
self-spun without a scintilla of support to which one can point”); Handler & Klein, 
supra note 3, at 48 (pointing to the Court’s minimal analysis of why government 
officials should be afforded absolute privilege). 
 187. See, e.g., Burch v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909) 
(providing that a subordinate government official may enjoy immunity from 
statements made in the course of their employment, but statements not made in 
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absolute privilege has hindered zoning boards, city councils, or 
watershed district boards from executing their duties with vigor.188  
It is simply injudicious to establish a rule that eliminates both the 
availability of compensation to victims of defamation and the 
deterrent to public officials from making knowingly false and 
malicious statements on such speculative grounds.189  
Proponents of extending privilege also claim that absolute 
privilege is necessary to ensure that public officials are able to 
devote their full time and attention to the responsibilities of their 
office without being tied up in litigation.190  However, this fear is 
mitigated by the fact that qualified privilege places the difficult 
burden of proving malice on the plaintiff.191  Also, as discussed in 
the next section,192 the Carradine rule actually increases the amount 
of litigation involving public officials due to its post-hoc factor 
analysis, as opposed to a bright-line rule.193 
Ultimately, courts must determine whether an extension of 
privilege is warranted by balancing “the public interest in free 
exchange of information . . . and the individual rights of people 
who might be defamed by unscrupulous participants in that 
process.”194  For the reasons stated above, Zutz sets out a better, 
more balanced rule.195 
B. The Zutz Rule Provides Certainty 
A bright-line, rank-based rule with narrow exceptions is better 
than the case-by-case, post-hoc factor analysis set forth in 
 
good faith or an honest belief enjoy no such immunity); Lowry v. Vedder, 40 
Minn. 475, 475, 42 N.W 542, 542 (1889) (stating that a communication made with 
malice is not entitled to immunity). 
 188. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 2010); Chamberlain v. Mathis, 
729 P.2d 905, 912 (Ariz. 1986). 
 189. See Chamberlain, 729 P.2d at 912. 
 190. Defamation, supra note 57, at 918. 
 191. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 111 (2011). 
 192. See infra Part IV.B. 
 193. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 369 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).    
 194. Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 70 (Minn. 2010) (Anderson, Paul H., J., 
dissenting). 
 195. See id. at 66 (“The people of Minnesota are better served by the 
application of a qualified, rather than absolute, privilege to members of watershed 
district boards.”); accord Lanier v. Higgins, 623 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) 
(discussing the competing interests of the public that officials act both responsibly 
and vigorously); ELDER, supra note 40, § 2:13 (criticizing the liberal trend to 
broadly extend absolute immunity when qualified immunity is adequate). 
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Carradine.196  The Zutz rule provides certainty to government 
officials to know in advance whether they enjoy absolute immunity 
to make defamatory statements, or if they must act in good faith 
and without malice in the course of their duty.197  In contrast, the 
Carradine rule requires a de novo evaluation of nearly every 
defamation suit involving a government official to determine if 
absolute privilege exists for the particular position and duty.198  
Ironically, as stated supra, this creates the very increase in litigation 
proponents are seeking to avoid.199  
One—perhaps unforeseen—consequence of adopting a 
Carradine-like rule is that it creates a de facto “presumption that the 
challenged action is within the officer’s scope of duty unless the 
plaintiff can prove otherwise.”200  All that typically exists in the 
record are mere “assertions that a specific official has the power to 
do what resulted in the defamation.”201  As admitted by the 
dissenting opinion in Barr, rarely are functions of an official 
position specifically enumerated.202  This has the effect of 
improperly shifting the burden of proof onto the plaintiff to prove 
that absolute privilege does not apply, rather than the defendant 
having to establish that absolute privilege does apply.203  
Therefore, the Zutz rule not only provides government officials 
with a clear rule in determining whether or not one enjoys absolute 
privilege, but also limits litigation by avoiding the post hoc factor 
analysis required with the Carradine test.  
 
 
 196. See Barr, 360 U.S. at 578–79 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).  But see id. at 573–
74 (majority opinion).  The majority in Barr rejected the rank test, stating that 
analysis should instead focus on “the duties with which the particular officer . . . is 
entrusted” to determine whether or not to expand immunity.  Id.  
 197. See id. at 578 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 198. See id. at 578–79.   
 199. See, e.g., id. at 571.    
 200. See id. at 579. 
 201. Id.  In Barr, for example, in response to the defendant’s assertion that the 
press release was authorized by his position, the court concluded, “we cannot say 
that it was not an appropriate exercise of the discretion with which an executive 
officer of petitioner’s rank is necessarily clothed.”  Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
 202. See id. at 579 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 203. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. f (1938); KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 15, § 111, at 772; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 629 and cases cited (2d ed. 1955). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
By the time Zutz was decided in 2010, a growing number of 
jurisdictions were extending absolute privilege to lower-level 
government positions.204  The Minnesota Supreme Court had to 
decide whether to join this trend or maintain the “narrow limits” 
Minnesota has placed on absolute privilege since it became a 
state.205 
Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly 
maintained that while high-ranking legislators ought to “enjoy the 
fullest liberty of speech,”206 providing unelected citizens such 
unbridled liberty strikes the wrong balance between the competing 
policies at stake.207  When it comes to subordinate government 
officials in Minnesota, qualified privilege provides adequate 
protection to all interests involved.208  
 
 
 204. See supra note 95.  
 205. Compare Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 223 (Minn. 1982) 
(holding that a top-level cabinet-like official enjoys absolute immunity, even from 
communicating defamatory material), with Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 
223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954) (stating that the recognized class of occasions 
where the publication of defamatory material is absolutely privileged is confined 
within “narrow limits”). 
 206. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951). 
 207. See Zutz v. Nelson, 788 N.W.2d 58, 64–66 (Minn. 2010). 
 208. See id. 
27
Holzer: Torts: Striking a Balance: Minnesota's Minority Stance on the Pri
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
